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WOE UNTO THOSE WHO REQUEST CONSENT: ETHICAL
AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN REJECTING A
DECEASED'S ANATOMICAL GIFT BECAUSE THERE IS NO
CONSENT BY THE SURVIVORS
LEONARD H. BUCKLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATED
"We do not have a shortage of organs [for transplants], we only have a
shortage of organs recovered."' The shortage is serious and the problem
gets worse each year. In 1988, four persons died per day while waiting on a
list for an organ transplant.2 In 1998, twelve persons died per day while
waiting for an organ. 3 In 2002, sixteen persons die each day. 4 Through a
combination Gf cadaver organ donation, living donation, and effective clini-
cal management, the number that die each day is stabilizing at about six-
teen, but the number of patients waiting for transplants keeps rising. 5 The
waiting list for organ transplants has steadily grown because more patients
are added to the list each year than die or receive transplants. 6 In 2002,
about 80,000 patients are listed as needing organ transplants. 7
. B.S. in Law 1955, J.D. 1957 University of Minnesota. Mr. Bucklin is an attorney who has
represented various medical organizations, and now acts as an ethics consultant. He received a
kidney transplant seventeen years ago. Since then he has been active in transplant affairs and has
served on the boards of various transplant organizations, including the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS). This article has not been submitted to those organizations, and the views ex-
pressed in this article do not purport to be the opinions of any organization.
1. Letter from Theodore A. Latour, Patient Representative, UNOS Kidney & Pancreas Allo-
cation Committee, to Daniel Hayes, MD, Chairman of the OPTN/UNOS Kidney & Pancreas
Transplantation Committee (July 7, 2000) (on file with author).
2. J.R. JOHNSON, A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES ORGAN DONOR PROGRAMS FOR THE
PRESUMED CONSENT SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE UNOS ETHICS COMMrITEE tbl. 1 (May 14, 1993).
3. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT, ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE FOR CLERGY I-1 (4th ed., 2000) [hereinafter A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR
CLERGY].
4. "Each day about 63 people receive an organ transplant, but another 16 people on the
waiting list die because not enough organs are available." Organ Donation, available at
http://www.organdonor.gov (last visited June 20, 2002).
5. Id.; Arthur Caplan, Organ Procurement and Transplantation: Ethical & Practical Issues,
available at http://www.upenn.edu/ldi/issuebrief2_5.htm (last visited July 29, 2002).
6. A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR CLERGY, supra note 3, at I-1.
7. Extramural Support Program for Projects to Increase Organ Procurement, 67 Fed. Reg.
31,349, 31,350 (May 9, 2002); UNOS, Snapshot of Patient Registrations on the National Trans-
plant Waiting List, available at http://www.unos.org (last modified June 30, 2002).
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Studies routinely find that the pool of cadaveric donors is sufficient to
provide enough transplant organs.8 About 15,000 persons die each year un-
der circumstances that make them suitable for organ donation. 9 But only
about 6,000 of these deaths result in the donation of an organ. 10 An average
of about 3.37 organs per donor can be recovered.1 1 If we used all 15,000
available donors, a pool of more than 50,000 organs would be created. This
is probably enough to substantially fulfill the requirements of the persons
waiting for transplants. 12 Yet there still is a shortage of organs recovered. 13
One reason for the shortage of recovered organs is the standard prac-
tices of numerous organ procurement organizations (OPOs) in procuring
organs for transplant.14 Many, and perhaps most, OPOs refuse to recover
organs validly donated by a decedent before death unless consent is given
by a next of kin and no other next of kin objects.15 One survey found only
four states take advantage of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
8. E.g., Gina Kolata, Organ Shortage Clouds New Transplant Era, SCIENCE, July 1, 1983, at
32.
9. LEWIN GROUP, INC., ROLES AND TRAINING IN THE DONATION PROCESS: A RESOURCE
GUIDE 8 (2000). Currently the federal government's Department of Health and Human Services
estimates 8,000 to 15,000 potential donors are available. Extramural Support Program for Pro-
jects to Increase Organ Procurement, supra note 7, at 31,350. To the contrary, "[s]tudies con-
ducted by the Centers for Disease Control of the U.S. Public Health Service suggest that at least
12,000 [based upon an age range of brain-dead donors from five to fifty-five years] and perhaps as
many as 27,000 [based upon an age range of brain-dead donors from birth to age sixty-five]" do-
nors are available. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 4 Comment, 8A U.L.A. 44 (1993)
(quoting HASTINGS CENTER REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT (Oct. 1985)). These
estimates depend on the observer's definition of what is a "useable" organ.
10. LEWIN GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 8.
11. Theresa J. Shafer et al, Impact of Medical Examiner/Coroner Practices on Organ Recov-
ery in the United States, 272 JAMA 1607, 1607 (1994). We speak here of the solid internal or-
gans, kidney, pancreas, liver, intestine, lung, and heart. Jeffery M. Prottas, Organ Procurement in
Europe and the United States, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 94, 96 (1985). In addition to the
solid internal organs, corneas, bone, skin, and other body parts are also needed and recovered. Id.
12. It would be sufficient because approximately 5,000 new patients are added to the list
each year. Shafer et al., supra note 11, at 1609 tbl.2. Over time, if 50,000 more organs were
available, the list would be whittled down to a point where supply could easily meet demand. Id.
13. Only about 18,000 organs are recovered each year. Theresa J. Shafer et al, Ethical
Analysis of Organ Recovery Denials by Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Justices of the Peace,
9 J. OF TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 232, 233 tbl. 1 (1999).
14. Dave Wendler & Neal Dickert, The Consent Process for Cadaveric Organ Procurement,
285 JAMA 329, 329, 333 (2001). Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) have essentially mo-
nopoly powers to procure organs within a geographical jurisdiction. OPOs receive funds from the
federal government to perform their functions. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1)-(2)(c) (1994).
15. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993). "In situations in
which family members could not be located, less than twenty-five percent of the respondents said
they would proceed with organ procurement despite the presence of a written directive." Id. at §
2(h) Comment, 8A U.L.A. 37 (quoting HASTINGS CENTER REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN
PROCUREMENT (Oct. 1985)).
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provisions by retrieving organs solely on the authority of a donor docu-
ment. 16 In 1985, the Hastings Center stated, "The key problems that hinder
organ donation include: ... 4. Failure on the part of medical personnel to
recover organs on the basis of written directives."17
The law and ethics involved in the organ procurement process need to
be addressed. A call has even been made for a national discussion ad-
dressing the ethical considerations that an OPO should use in deciding
whether to ask for consent by a decedent's next of kin.18 Therefore, this ar-
ticle is a review of both legal and ethical considerations in the reported
"[f]ailure on the part of medical personnel to recover organs on the basis of
written directives." 19 This article will examine whether it is legally im-
proper and unethical for an OPO to refuse a decedent's organ gift on the ba-
sis that a next of kin has not given consent.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE GIFT OF THE DECEDENT
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMON LAW: WHO OWNS THE DEAD
BODY?
"Property" that can be given away is a concept that depends on "rights
of ownership." 20 In common parlance, a person does not "own property"
unless he has most of the possible rights of ownership. 21
As early as 1749, it was decided in England that after death no one had
a "property" right of "ownership" in a dead body.22 During the 19th cen-
tury, a number of English cases repeated the idea that no one owns a dead
16. Thomas D. Overcast et al., Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors,
251 JAMA 1559, 1561 (1984). Since January 1, 2001, with the encouragement of a statutory
amendment, Virginia is also taking advantage of the UAGA provisions. Conversation with Bruce
Nicely, RN, CPTC, LifeNet Transplant Services (Jan. 22, 2001).
17. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 20 (quoting HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT (Oct. 1985)).
18. Wendler & Dickert, supra note 14, at 333.
19. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 20 (quoting HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY
ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT (Oct. 1985)).
20. E.g., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 18 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977).
21. TONY HONORE, MAKING LAW BIND 165-79 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987); JUDITH J.
THOMPSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 57 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990).
22. PDG Skegg, Medical Uses of Corpses and the 'No Property' Rule, 32 MED. SCI. & L.
311, 311 (1992). Exelby v. Handyside was tried at Common Pleas in 1749 (Matthews, 1983) and
was reported in 2 East's Pleas of the Crown 652 as having held that there were no property rights
in corpses. Id.
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body.23 Now, "[ilt has long been accepted that in English law the dead
body... does not have an owner, and is not the subject of property." 24
It has been speculated that there were no property rights in a dead body
for several reasons. 25 The first basic reason was jurisdictional.26 Corpses
were normally buried in church ground and became entities over which the
ecclesiastical courts had control.27 As a result, the common law courts had
no jurisdiction to determine property rights in corpses. 28 The second basic
reason was social.29 Judges did not want a body devalued by treating it as
mere property. 30 There was also a fear that if any person had property
rights in a corpse, then body parts would be bought and sold in the mar-
ket.3 1
But whatever the reason, the common law of "no owner of a dead
body" seems to have been unchallenged in England. 32 The common law of
England became the basis of decision in most American cases. 33 The the-
ory of "no owner" had negative implications for transplanting organs.34 For
example, if there is no property ownership after death, people may not issue
binding instructions on what should be done with their own bodies after
death.35 Also, if parents gave their child's body to a hospital for burial, the
parents no longer had any rights in the body.36 The parents then could not
complain about the treatment of the body, its mutilation, or the manner of
burial, even if it was contrary to their expressed desire.37
23. See, e.g., Foster v. Dodd (1867) LR 3 QB 67, 77. "A dead body by law belongs to no
one." Id.
24. Skegg, supra note 22, at 311.
25. Id. at 312.
26. Id. at 312-13.





32. Daniel E. Gadzala, Anatomical Gifts: Considerations and Critiques, ME D. TRIAL
TECHNIQUE Q. 464, 467-68 (1992); see also R.F. Martin, Annotation, Corpse-Removal and Rein-
ternment, 21 A.L.R.2D 472, 476-79 (1952).
33. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (1966); see also Gadzala, supra note 32, at 467-68. A few
American courts ruled that although there was no property right in a dead body, a person still
could, by will, dispose of his body as he deemed appropriate. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2.
34. Gadzala, supra note 32, at 467-68.
35. Williams v. Williams (1881-82) LR 20 Ch. D. 659, 663. "ITihere can be no property in
the dead body of a human being .... It follows that a man cannot by will dispose of his dead
body." Id. at 662-63, 665; Paul Matthews, Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 193, 210 (1983). Although there was no property right in a dead body, a few
American courts ruled that a person could use a will to dispose of a dead body as he wished. E.g.,
Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, *3 (Mass. 1868); see also Martin, supra note 32, at 484.
36. McCoy v. Ga. Baptist Hosp., 306 S.E.2d 746, 746-48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
37. Id. at 748.
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All that most courts did was to declare a right of the executor or next of
kin to possession of the body prior to burial, and this right existed only for
the purpose of burial.38 Most courts did not call the limited right to bury a
body a property right, but only went so far as to use the words, "privilege,"
"right," or "quasi-property right."39 Even the respected American Law In-
stitute, in its Restatements of the Law, could find no definition for property
in a body.40
"It seems reasonably obvious that the word 'quasi-property' [was]
something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality
the personal feelings of the survivors [were] being protected, under a fiction
likely to deceive no one but a lawyer." 4 1 This vague interest in controlling
the body for the purpose of burial had only vague legal protection, and the
interest of the next of kin in regards to preventing organ removal was
equally vague.42
B. THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT: A SOLUTION FOR THE
TRANSPLANT COMMUNITY
This lack of clarity in the ownership of corpses caused indecision in the
transplant community. Therefore, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference) set out to solve the indecision
of the transplant community regarding the rights to a deceased's body.4
3
38. Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 718-20 (8th Cir. 1984); O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906,
906-08 (Cal. 1899); Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335, 336-40 (Iowa 1907); Burney v. Chil-
dren's Hosp. In Boston, 47 N.E. 401, 401-02 (Mass. 1897); Nichols v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 109 A.
905, 906 (Vt. 1919).
39. See, e.g., Fuller, 724 F.2d at 718-20 (finding next of kin have quasi-property right in a
dead body). There are some courts that find a person having burial rights to have "property" in
the body. See, e.g., Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238-40 (Minn. 1891); D. W. MEYERS, THE
HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 101-02 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1990) (discussing limited
property rights).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977). The Restatement avoided the defini-
tion problem of "property in a body" by stating the "right" of the next of kin in reverse fashion,
thus: "One who intentionally... operates upon the body of a dead person ... is subject to liability
to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body." Id.
41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984).
42. See Daniel G. Jardine, Liability Issues Arising Out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement
Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 Wis. L.
REV. 1655, 1660 (1990) (stating that "the common law was ill-equipped to provide guidance in
the unique area of organ procurement and transplantation").
43. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 22 (1993) (recog-
nizing the need for a comprehensive act addressing organ donation, and concluding that the
UAGA, wherever enacted, would eliminate uncertainty and protect all parties); see also Gloria J.
Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable Participants in a
Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 67 (1995) (stating that
the UAGA as amended in 1987, better addresses the concern over providing an "encouraged vol-
unteerism" system with teeth, which is needed to increase the supply of transplantable organs); E.
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In 1968, the Conference drafted and sent to state legislatures the Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act (1968 UAGA).44 All fifty states enacted the
1968 UAGA.45 The core of the statute was simple: create new, clear, and
definite statutory law allowing a living person to donate body organs upon
death, and make that right superior to the rights of anyone else.46 The next
of kin or other custodian of the body could only make such an anatomical
gift if the deceased made no organ gift before death.47 Thus, the 1968
UAGA established a legal right for competent people to donate their organs
upon death that would prevail over any supposed property rights of their
next of kin, and this right had priority over the family's privileges to bury
the body and priority over its wishes regarding transplantation.4 8
The small legal step involved was that the 1968 UAGA treated organs
of a living person as an asset of the living person.49 The 1968 UAGA was
contrary to the common law, and it resolutely allowed living persons to
distribute their bodies upon death.50 The 1968 UAGA only went so far as
needed to allow donations of organs for transplantation. 51 It did not go so
far as to call the body of a living or dead person "property." 52 It did not ad-
dress creating an interest sufficient for sale of body parts, but simply made
a legally clear statement of a process and a right for persons to donate their
organs, after death, to an OPO for organ transplants. 53
The medical community refused to give full effect to the law.54 The
problem did not lie in legal theory, adverse court interpretations, or ambi-
Blythe Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAW. 919, 921-24 (1968) (recognizing
legal uncertainties of organ donation laws during the pre-UAGA era as providing the major basis
for the adoption of the model act).
44. UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 8, 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (1983).
45. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 20 (1993). Particular
state laws may vary, but it is beyond the scope of this article to address the particular variations
between the states.
46. Id. at 20-22.
47. Id. §§ 2(h), 3, 3 Comment, 8A U.L.A. 34, 40-41.
48. Id. § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34.
49. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1983); see also L.B. An-
drews, The Body as Property: Some Philosophical Reflections-A Response to J.F. Childress, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROCS. 2149, 2150-51 (1992).
50. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 34; Andrews, supra note 49, at
2150-51.
51. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT(1968) § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41.
52. See generally id. §§ 1-11, 8A U.L.A. 15-67; UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) §§ I-
17, 8A U.L.A. 19-132 (1993).
53. See generally UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) §§ 1-17, 8A U.L.A. 19-132.
54. Id. Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 22; see also Jardine, supra note 42, at 1661.
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guity of the statute, but in the perception of the medical community about
what was needed to get organs from the "donor." 55
After many years working in the medical and legal transplant commu-
nities, I have observed that the medical community and the legal commu-
nity do not use the word "donor" in the same sense. That difference may be
the root of the problem of the medical community's insistence on a next of
kin signing something after the death of a person who made a valid organ
gift while alive. To the medical community, "donor" and "source" are
identical-a dead body-and "donor" has no special legal significance.
The medical community seems to think in terms of a "donation" of organs
only coming from a dead body; therefore, it seems natural in that commu-
nity to ask for consent from a presently living person regarding the dead
body. Likewise, the transplant community commonly calls the patient get-
ting the organ the "donee," not realizing that to lawyers, the "donee" is the
OPO first obtaining the organ.56
To the contrary, in the legal community, the "donor" and the "source"
are not necessarily identical, and the terms do have different legal signifi-
cance.57 To the legal community, the "donor" is the person who made the
gift while alive.58 The "source" is the body from which the gift is taken. 59
If the "source" died without making an anatomical gift, the next of kin has
an opportunity to become a "donor" of a part of the "source." 60 Moreover,
the OPO is the "donee" of the gift from the donor.61 To the courts, the
"donee" of a UAGA gift is not the organ recipient patient.62 So, to lawyers
the matter of organ donation can be done before death and is completed by
the "donee" OPO simply accepting the gift.63
55. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 22; see also Jardine,
supra note 42, at 1661.
56. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41; Jardine, supra note 42, at 1664
n.50.
57. A donor is "an individual who makes an anatomical gift of all or part of the individual's
body." UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 1(4), 8A U.L.A. 30 (1993). Source is defined as
"the originator or primary agent of an act, circumstance, or result." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1401 (7th ed. 1997). The law's conceptual framework of "gift" has a living person, the "donor,"
who has done everything necessary to make a gift, before his death, of something which in the
future will be the primary agent of a result, i.e., a transplanted organ. If he has not done every-
thing necessary to make the gift, he is not an organ donor, although his dead body may still be a
"source."
58. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 1(4), 8A U.L.A. 30.
59. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (7th ed. 1997).
60. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1983).
61. Id. § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41; Jardine, supra note 42, at 1664 n.50.
62. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 6, 8A U.L.A. 53 (1993); see also Jardine, supra
note 42, at 1664 n.50 (discussing Williams v. Hoffman, 223 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Wis. 1974)).
63. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993); UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT (1968) § 2(a)-(e), 8A U.L.A. 34-35.
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By 1987, the Uniform Laws Commissioners recognized that the medi-
cal community was confused about who was the donor, who was the donee,
and the ability of a decedent to make an effective donation.64 Hence, the
Commissioners prepared a revised UAGA (1987 UAGA)65 with word
changes to remove the uncertainty of the medical community. 66 The core
language of the 1987 UAGA is bold, and the official comments are the le-
gal equivalent of hitting people with a two-by-four to get their attention.67
SECTION 8. RIGHTS AND DUTIES AT DEATH. (a) Rights of a
donee [e.g., OPO] created by an anatomical gift are superior to
rights of others except with respect to autopsies under Section
11 (b). A donee may accept or reject an anatomical gift.... After
removal of the part, custody of the remainder of the body vests in
the person under obligation to dispose of the body.68
COMMENT. In subsection (a) the first sentence is a restatement of
Section 2(e) of the original Act . .. [which] recognizes and gives
legal effect to the right of the individual to dispose of his own body
without subsequent veto by others ... If the donee [e.g., OPO]
accepts the gift, absolute ownership vests in him.69
The prefatory note to the revised 1987 UAGA went on to emphasize the
purpose of the revisions. It stated, "[t]he proposed amendments... require
that the intentions of a donor be followed. For example, no witnesses are
required on the document of gift (Section 2(b)) and consent of next of kin
64. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GItr ACT (1987) § 1 Comment, 8A U.L.A. 30-3 1.
65. See id. Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 20.
66. See id. § 1(3), 8A U.L.A. 30.
The 1987 Act explicitly states that medical attendants can rely upon a 'document of
gift.' No other person needs to consent to taking organs. This express language does
not really change the 1968 Act, but relieves the anxieties of those in the medical set-
ting who could not quite bring themselves to believe that the 1968 Act really allowed
them to rely on the 'document of gift.'
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-summaries/uniformacts-s-aga87.asp (last visited May
20, 2002).
Concern had been expressed that donee organizations and hospitals had in some cases
been reluctant to rely on a donor card or document of gift if relatives were opposed to
the donation. Section 2(h) of the Act makes clear that a gift not revoked by the donor
prior to death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or agreement of any per-
son after the donor's death.
Martin D. Begleiter, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, PROB. & PROP. 51, 51-52 (Mar.-Apr.
1989).
67. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § I Comment, 8A U.L.A. 30-31 (1993).
68. Id. § 8, 8A U.L.A. 55-56.
69. Id. § 8 Comment, 8A U.L.A. 56 (emphasis added).
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after death is not required if the donor has made an anatomical gift (Sec-
tion 2(h))."70
The 1987 Commissioners reiterated their original (1968) intent by us-
ing stronger legislative language.71 The language reiterated that the inten-
tions of the donor be followed.72 The language stressed that the donor's
intentions could not be revoked by any other person after the donor's
death.73 The 1987 language should remove any uncertainty that exists
within an OPO in the states that have adopted the 1987 UAGA. The 1987
UAGA addressed the transplant community's consent requirement.
74 It
specified that a donor's gift "does not require the consent or concurrence of
any person."75 The Commissioners thought it was clear: the legislation
gave legally supreme and binding effect to donors' rights to donate their
own body parts without veto by others.
76
As of September 30, 2000, twenty-three states had revised their UAGA
statutes by adopting the 1987 version.77 As we have seen, this version of
the UAGA only put the 1968 UAGA rights into stronger language. As we
will see in later portions of this article, the courts have not hesitated to ap-
ply the law of either the 1968 or 1987 UAGA to uphold a donor's gift over
the asserted rights of surviving kin.7
8
Like the Conference, the Council on State Governments also noted the
hesitancy of the transplant community to utilize the 1968 UAGA provisions
present in all states. 79 Consequently, it has urged the remaining states to
adopt additional legislative revisions such as the 1987 UAGA,80 and some
states have enacted various modifications to their versions of the UAGA.81
The latest appears to be Kentucky, which amended its statutes to prohibit
next of kin from interfering with a known decision of a decedent to donate
70. Id. Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 22 (emphasis added).
71. Id. § 2(h) Comment, 8A U.L.A. 36.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 2(h) Comment, 8A U.L.A. 36 (1993).
77. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 2000-2001
REFERENCE BOOK 116-20 (Chicago, 2000). The states are Arizona, Alaska, California, Connecti-
cut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wis-
consin. Id.
78. See cases cited infra note 112.
79. Committee on Suggested State Legislation, 56 Suggested State Legislation 123, 123
(1997) available at http://ssl.csg.org/dockets/dockpolfles/97vol56.pdf (last visited May 20, 2002).
80. See id. (recommending the Pennsylvania version of the 1987 UAGA, as adopted by
Pennsylvania in 1995, which points out that consent of the next of kin is not necessary).
81. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.237 (Michie 2001).
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organs. 82 The driving force or pressure behind the legislation does not seem
to have been a mob of next of kin shouting in the hallways of hospitals. In-
stead, it is more likely that there has been a legislatively perceived need to
reassure local OPOs that they indeed have the power they already had under
the 1968 UAGA.83
The 1987 revision removed the requirement of witnesses to the donor's
decision, which was present in the 1968 UAGA.84 The unverified donor's
signature, by itself, is sufficient under the 1987 UAGA to establish an organ
gift.85 Under the 1987 UAGA, an imprint on a driver's license, based on a
donor's decision communicated to the driver's license agency, suffices as a
document of gift.86 In short, the OPOs in states that have adopted the 1987
UAGA no longer need to worry about the formalities by which the donor's
decision to donate organs was recorded. 87
The 1987 UAGA is so strongly in support of retrieval of organs, and
against any obstruction by next of kin, that it has limited the time period
given a next of kin to appear. 88 The medical profession often seems un-
aware that the public coroner or the public health officer may donate an or-
gan if no document indicating the donor's intent can be found and no next
of kin is available within a reasonable time period.89 As the 1987 UAGA
comments state:
Subsection (a)(2) [the right of the coroner to donate the organs]
seeks to balance societal and family interests, that is, to increase
the size of the donor pool and to give the family the opportunity to
make or refuse to make an anatomical gift. The balance in this
subsection is on the side of increasing the size of the donor pool.
The duty to search the medical record or to inform next of kin is
limited to 'a reasonable effort taking into account the useful life of
the part. . . ' This reflects a concern expressed in the Comments to
the original Act: '. . . the very limited time available following
82. See id. (stating "the individual's family members.., shall not have any legal standing or
authority to modify the decedent's wishes or deny the anatomical gift from being made"). This
statute became effective in July 2000. Id.
83. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 22 (1993).
84. Id. § 2 Comment, 8A U.L.A. 35.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 34.
87. Committee on Suggested State Legislation, supra note 79, at 123.
88. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFt ACT (1987) § 4(a)(2), 8A U.L.A. 43 (authorizing an official to
procure an organ if he "has made a reasonable effort, taking into consideration the useful life of
the [organ], to ... inform [next of kin] of their option to .. . object to making, an anatomical
gift").
89. Id. § 4(a).
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death for the successful recovery of such critical tissues . . . ' The
time will vary depending upon the part involved. In the case of
corneal tissue, the time is within six hours after death. In the case
of organs, the need, availability, and efficacy of life support sys-
tems must be considered. If removal must be immediate and there
is no medical or other record and no person specified in Section
3(a) is present, the... [coroner may donate the organs].90
In short, the 1987 UAGA gives coroners and public health officials the
right to systematically remove any body part for transplantation within a
few hours after death if they have no knowledge of any decedent's or quali-
fying relative's objection. 9' This has been considered a legislative taking
without consent, overriding any actual, but unknown, objection by the de-
cedent or next of kin.92 On legal challenge to such a governmental action,
the Florida Supreme Court held that the family's interest in the disposition
of the corpse was not a protected liberty, due process, or property interest.93
This case shows that the UAGA means what it says-where there is a
signed donor card, there is no legal basis for an OPO to seek consent of the
next of kin.94 The state has granted authority for the gift, and the family has
no superior interest.95
However, misperception by the medical community still persists.96 For
example, Kathryn Schroeter in advising nurses that they need to ask for
"consent" for organ removal, says, "The body of a dead person becomes the
property of the next of kin, guardian, or medical examiner." 97 This is sim-
ply not true. First, the body of a dead person does not become the property
of anyone. 98 Second, if there is a signed donor card by the decedent, the
limited privilege of the next of kin to later get the body for burial is subject
to the superior right of the OPO to the body.99 Medical personnel should be
told that, under the UAGA, the decedent donor has already made an effec-
tive donation of an asset to the OPO.100 Immediately upon the death of the
90. Id. § 4(a) Comment, 8A U.L.A. 44-45.
91. Id. § 4(a), 8A U.L.A. 43.
92. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 1986).
93. Id. at 1193.
94. Id.; Kathryn Schroeter & Gloria J. Taylor, Ethical Considerations in Organ Donation for
Critical Care Nurses, 19 CRITICAL CARE NURSE 60, 64 (Apr. 1999).
95. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1189, 1193-94.
96. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
97. Schroeter & Taylor, supra note 94, at 66.
98. See supra Part H.A.
99. See supra text accompanying note 48.
100. Schroeter & Taylor, supra note 94, at 64.
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decedent donor, the OPO is the donee.101 The next of kin cannot interfere
with the donation that has already been made. 102
Anecdotal evidence shows that it is only the OPOs that do not seem to
get the message.103 People outside the organ business believe designating
Organ Donor on their driver's license is sufficient to complete the dona-
tion.104 Indeed, they would likely be surprised to find that OPOs seem to
think the next of kin needs to consent to their own act of signing a donor
card.
The statutory language of the 1987 UAGA is clear: "An anatomical gift
that is not revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable, [and] does not
require the consent or concurrence of any person after the donor's death."105
Still, OPOs continue to require the consent of next of kin after the donor's
death.106 There is a startling difference between legal reality and the per-
ception of legality by the OPOs that seek consent from the next of kin of a
deceased donor.
III. THE PROTECTED LEGAL STATUS OF AN OPO IN RECEIPT OF
THE GIFT
In all fifty states the OPO is not liable in a civil action for taking an or-
gan without consent of the next of kin provided the OPO attempts to act in
accordance with the UAGA.107 "A hospital, physician, surgeon, . . . or
other person, who acts in accordance with this [Act] or with the applicable
anatomical gift law of another state... or attempts in good faith to do so is
not liable for that act in a civil action or criminal proceeding."108 Courts
have consistently given the broadest possible reading to this grant of pro-
tection to the medical community. 09 The immunity has been decided by
101. Id.
102. See Overcast et al., supra note 16, at 1561.
103. Id. at 1561-62.
104. THEODORE A. LATOUR, HOW TO IMPROVE THE ORGAN RECOVERY SYSTEM 4 (2000)
(on file with author); see also Jardine, supra note 42, at 1666.
105. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993).
106. Overcast et al., supra note 16, at 1562.
107. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 1 (c), 8A U.L.A. 59-60.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Rahman v. Mayo Clinic, 578
N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Kelly-Nevils v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 526 N.W.2d
15, 19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Brown v. Del. Valley Transplant Program, 615 A.2d 1379, 1383
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928,
931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
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courts, not by juries, soon after the suits have been brought.110 The lan-
guage of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is typical:
The UAGA insulates individuals involved in the organ procure-
ment process from civil and criminal liability, so long as they act
in good faith. ... That statute provides immunity from suit, not
simply a defense to liability. ... Whether actions constitute good
faith is a question of law, properly resolved on summary judg-
ment.IlI
The UAGA immunity clause has never been successfully attacked.112
It is well drafted to do just what the transplant industry wanted done. The
author of an article for attorneys on the possible rights that exist under the
UAGA properly concluded: "The Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act represents
the ultimate union of medical and legal ingenuity in a document which
serves, without compromise of either, to preserve our expectations to both
life and justice."11 3
An extreme case for immunity protection, Ramirez v. Health Partners
of Southern Arizona,1' 4 has already been adjudicated. In Ramirez, a hospi-
tal worker mistakenly harvested bones from a decedent when the next of kin
had specifically refused consent to harvest bones."l 5 The decedent's family
sued the hospital for negligence, battery, and breach of contract.116 The
Arizona State Constitution provided that the right to sue for negligence
would never be abrogated.ll 7 Nevertheless, the court protected the OPO by
holding that the statutory immunity against suit was absolute, barring the
negligence claim by the next of kin for mutilation of the body.118
110. See, e.g., Rahman, 578 N.W.2d at 805; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (concluding
that because qualified immunity was immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, it
is appropriately resolved at the summary judgment phase); Kelly-Nevils, 526 N.W.2d at 19 (hold-
ing the question of good faith under the UAGA is properly a matter of law for the court to decide);
Nicoletta, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (concluding the issue of whether a hospital acted in good faith is a
question of law appropriate for the court to act on by summary judgment); Brown, 615 A.2d at
1385 (concluding that the undisputed facts established the good faith of the hospital as a matter of
law).
111. Rahman, 578 N.W.2d at 805.
112. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1194 (Fla. 1986) (upholding a statute authorizing
medical examiners to remove corneal tissue without consent of next of kin); Ga. Lions Eye Bank
Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (upholding a statute authorizing cornea removal);
Nicoletta, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 933 (stating that good faith compliance with the UAGA provides im-
munity to retrieving eyes); Williams v. Hoffman, 223 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Wis. 1974).
113. Gadzala, supra note 32, at 478.
114. 972 P.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1998).
115. Ramirez, 972 P.2d at 659-60.
116. Id. at 660.
117. Id. at 664.
118. Id. at 665-67.
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Thus, any lingering doubt by OPOs as to legal liability should be swept
away by the immunity section of the UAGA.119 The language of one court
in upholding the statutory immunity is instructive; it stated, "limitation on
liability contained in [UAGA of 1968 section 7(c)] ... is justified by the le-
gitimate public purpose of encouraging doctors to participate in the removal
of organs following death, and therefore increasing their supply."120
Another court has said:
To require further action on the part of the defendant would not
only impose an unreasonable duty upon the Hospital, but would
also run afoul of public policy considerations, as such a decision
would tend to jeopardize the whole process of organ donation by
causing unnecessary delays, thereby frustrating the entire intent of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 121
No physician has ever been successfully sued for accepting an organ
donation.122 The courts uniformly have recognized the validity of the
statutory immunity provided by the UAGA.123 The latest data, from a sur-
vey of all OPOs, shows eight of the sixty-one total OPOs in the United
States have been sued in the last five years. 24 The OPOs that have been
sued "report either 1 or 2 suits in the previous 5 years, none of which an
OPO has lost.... OPOs have approximately a 1 in 2500 chance of being
sued.. .and essentially no chance of losing such suits." 125
Thus, the data reflects what a lawyer would predict. An OPO does not
have to fear losing a lawsuit for taking a decedent's gift without consent of
next of kin or even against the wishes of the next of kin. 126
119. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. 59-60 (1993).
120. Williams v. Hoffman, 223 N.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Wis. 1974); see also Jardine, supra
note 42, at 1663 & n.41.
121. Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928, 933 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987).
122. See Jardine, supra note 42, at 1666 (citing Jeffrey M. Prottas, The Rules for Asking and
Answering; The Role of Law in Organ Donation, 63 U. Det. L. Rev. 183 (1985)); see also cases
cited supra note 112.
123. See cases cited supra note 112. See generally Thomas R. Trenkener, Annotation, Tort
Liability of Physician or Hospital in Connection with Organ or Tissue Transplant Procedures, 76
A.L.R.3D 890 (1977).
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IV. THE CONTINUED PRACTICE OF REFUSING ORGAN GIFTS
In 1985, Jeffrey Prottas reported:
No organ procurement agency will procure organs from a deceased
against the wishes of that deceased's next of kin, notwithstanding
the presence of a signed donor card. Indeed, virtually no OP[O]
will retrieve cadaveric organs when they cannot locate the next of
kin. Thus, even silence is usually sufficient to stop an organ re-
trieval despite an individual's compliance with the terms of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 127
In 1990, Peter Singer reported: "In practice, physicians usually accept the
family's wishes when they are in conflict with the donor card." 128 In 2001,
Wendler and Dickert reported: "[31% of] OPOs reported that they follow
the deceased's wishes .... (31 %) follow the next of kin's wishes....
(21%) procure organs if neither party objects."129 Although it may be con-
cluded that the trend is away from consent, the data show that a majority of
OPOs continue to refuse a decedent's gift unless ratified by consent of a
next of kin and no other next of kin objects.130
OPOs and the transplantation community use the term "consent" to de-
scribing what they seek to obtain before taking an organ.131 The term "con-
sent" is not a legally correct term for the practice of OPOs.132 OPOs that
request next of kin "consent" to an existing organ donation perhaps do not
understand the legal definition of a gift.133 A person receiving a gift from a
donor does not need the "consent" of anyone except himself in order to re-
ceive the gift.134 An OPO which says they as a donee will not take a gift
from a donor unless they get "consent" from a third party is in the legal po-
127. Jeffrey M. Prottas, The Rules for Asking and Answering: The Role of Law in Organ Do-
nation, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 183, 186 (1985) (citing Jeffrey M. Prottas, Organ Procurement in
Europe and the United States, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 94, 101-02 (1985)).
128. Peter A. Singer, A Review of Public Policies to Procure and Distribute Kidneys for
Transplantation, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 523, 523 (1990).
129. Wendler & Dickert, supra note 14, at 329.
130. Id.
131. Prottas, supra note 11, at 100.
132. See Jardine, supra note 42, at 1658 (stating that "'consent' is a misnomer").
133. See Prottas, supra note 11, at 190 (stating a physician's fear of liability may stem from
not understanding the law); see also Jardine, supra note 42, at 1666.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 31.1 (1992). The only consent necessary in a gift
of an organ is the consent of the donor. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2, 8A U.L.A. 33-
34 (1993). It is generally presumed that a donee will accept a gift that is beneficial, and the re-
ceipt of an organ is beneficial to both the organ recipient and the OPO. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROP. § 31.1 Comment I. Only acceptance by the donee of a gift is necessary for a gift to be
complete. Id. § 31.1.
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sition of rejecting the gift.135 The gift, once rejected, legally might no
longer exist, and the donee OPO may have lost its absolute right to take the
valid gift and see that someone on the waiting list benefits.
So, if an OPO knows there is a gift, but seeks to obtain the gift from a
next of kin, the OPO is in the precarious position of having refused the
anatomical gift. 136 Having refused the decedent's gift, the OPO is in the
position of then asking the next of kin to make the gift by "consent." Le-
gally, the OPO is asking the next of kin to make a new gift of the same item
that the OPO has already once refused.
The immunity clause of the UAGA is for persons acting "in accor-
dance" with the statute. 137 Plainly, accepting a valid organ gift of a dece-
dent is acting "in accordance" with the statute. 138 But what of an OPO that
seeks consent when the comments to the 1987 statute clearly show that both
the 1968 and the 1987 UAGA do not want "consent" sought? 39 At least
one court has found delaying organ procurement to seek unnecessary con-
sent is contrary to public policy. 140 In my opinion, an OPO's rejection of a
valid gift under the state's UAGA and then seeking "consent" for a new gift
of the identical item is not "in accordance" with the statutory provisions. 41
Such a rejection does not follow thestatute, make legal sense, or make good
practical sense.
The surprising nature of an OPO's rejection of a decedent's gift is em-
phasized if we consider what an OPO's reaction would be if that same de-
cedent gave an OPO one million dollars in a document that took effect upon
death. An OPO given a million-dollar gift would not likely first reject the
gift and then go to a next of kin and ask for "consent" to receive the be-
quest. Yet OPOs do just that when they reject a decedent's anatomical gift
and instead seek consent from a next of kin. It would be no more danger-
ous for the OPO or hospital to take the gift of an organ than it would be to
take a gift of a million dollars from the decedent, even against the wishes of
the next of kin.
What are the reasons given by OPOs for their interpretation of the
UAGA? A typical statement in the literature of the transplant community
135. Jardine, supra note 42, at 1658.
136. Id.
137. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 1l(c), 8A U.L.A. 59-60 (1993).
138. Id. § 4(a)(1)-(7), 8A U.L.A. 43.
139. See supra Part II.B.
140. Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928, 932-33 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987).
141. See Jardine, supra note 42, at 1664.
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expresses some of the common reasons given by OPOs for seeking consent
of the next of kin:
[A]Ithough disposition authority lies with the deceased, most hos-
pitals are unwilling to ignore the fact that legal accountability to
living family members far exceeds that accorded to deceased pa-
tients. The threat of litigation and bad publicity effectively estab-
lishes a family's veto power concerning disposition of organs,
which can override even the written wishes of the deceased. 142
This typical statement is wrong in what it describes as a "fact" and in what
it describes as "veto power." It gives two "excuses" for an OPO's rejection
of a donation by a decedent. The first excuse is that an OPO might be
sued. 143 But if sued, the OPO would not likely be liable.144 The actual re-
ported data of suits and the legal analysis made above show that this excuse
is unfounded. 145 It is just not correct to say there is great legal accountabil-
ity to next of kin.146 No one should ever say that there is any real threat of a
suit for taking an organ pursuant to a donor card as long as no one appeared
prior to the organ removal to claim that the decedent revoked the decision
before death.147 Hopefully, statements that legal liability could flow from
accepting a decedent's gift and ignoring a survivor's objection will be re-
moved from the transplant community's literature.
Indeed, as this article sets out in Section V, the real threat of suit is the
threat that an OPO will be sued in a class action by all those on the trans-
plant list in their region for refusing to accept the gifts of decedents.148
Excuse number two is the bad publicity excuse. 149 Since most Ameri-
cans approve of organ donation,150 it is difficult to imagine a newspaper's
editor siding with a next of kin who wants to prevent his deceased relative's
decision to make an organ donation. It is more likely that the newspaper
142. Laura A. Siminoff & Mathew D. Leonard, Financial Incentives: Alternatives to the Al-
truistic Model of Organ Donation, 9 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 250, 251 (1999).
143. Id.; see also Jardine, supra note 42, at 1666.
144. See supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Siminoff & Leonard, supra note 142, at 251 (stating it is the threat of liti-
gation from living family members that causes hospitals to ignore the deceased's organ donation
wishes).
147. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2(k), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993).
148. See infra Part V.
149. Siminoff & Leonard, supra note 142, at 251; see also Jardine, supra note 42, at 1666
(stating that the medical profession is concerned "that there will be a backlash of public senti-
ment").
150. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37-38 (1986); see also Jardine, supra note
42, at 1666.
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would paint the next of kin as a person trying to frustrate a decedent's dying
wish and call the OPO a hero for implementing the moral act of the dece-
dent. As a proper moral exercise by the person whose organs are donated,
transplantation is supported by all major religions.151 Therefore, bad pub-
licity is not likely from an OPO's acceptance of the decedent's gift of life.
There is often another excuse given by OPOs when seeking consent for
an organ gift-the lack of an easy procedure to check whether the deceased
really made a donor decision. 152 When investigated, this excuse can only
mean that an adequate procedure has not been set up between the particular
OPO and the government bureau involved. The UAGA statutes of all states
allow driver's license registration of donors. 153 The states make it a re-
quirement, in diverse ways, that the driver's license bureau allows donor
information to be given to OPOs.154 Driver's license information about or-
gan donation consent must be, by statute, given to the OPO.155 It is not an
insurmountable task for OPOs to get donor information. In today's world
of faxes and computers, it is possible for the state to respond in minutes to a
request by an OPO for donor information. The officials on both
sides-OPO and government bureau-just need to get together to set up a
format for quick exchange of the information. In this day of computers,
there is no reason why a simple file of driver's license names and decisions
to donate cannot be accessed by an authorized individual at any time.
The practice of the New Mexico OPO may be typical. The New Mex-
ico OPO will not rely or even follow-up on the symbol on a New Mexico
driver's license that declares the person has signed a donor instrument. 156
The OPO takes the position that it must see a copy of the actual document
151. A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR CLERGY, supra note 3, V-2 to V-5.
152. Overcast et al., supra note 16, at 1561.
153. Prottas, supra note 11, at 185 n.l (citing the Report to the Health Resources and Service
Administration in 1985). All states use driver's licenses, but the approach is uncoordinated across
the states. JOHNSON, supra note 2, tbl.9.
154. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 12-13.
155. Although the different states use different formats, some typical provisions are:
Virginia Code at section 32.1-292.1(B): "Any law-enforcement officer may conduct an adminis-
trative search of the subject's Department of Motor Vehicles driver record to determine the per-
son's authorization for organ donation or refusal of organ donation." VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-
292.1(B) (2001). Another example is found in Florida Statutes section 732.915(4):
The registry shall be maintained in a manner which will allow, through electronic and
telephonic methods, immediate access to organ and tissue donation documents 24
hours a day, 7 days a week. Hospitals, organ and tissue procurement agencies .. . shall
be allowed access through coded means to the information stored in the registry.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732,915(4) (West Supp. 2002).
156. Conversation with Laurie S. Garretson, Executive Director, New Mexico Donor Serv-
ices (Oct. 25, 2001). I use New Mexico as an example, not because it is especially bad, but rather
because it is not a special case. It is a typical experience that I have had in talking with the execu-
tive directors of OPOs that still insist on consent from the next of kin.
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signed by the donor even if it sees the organ donor imprint on the dece-
dent's license.157 Generally, it is not possible for the OPO to see a copy of
the document possessed by the driver's license bureau; therefore, the dece-
dent's gift is rejected in favor of seeking consent by the next of kin. 158
The legislation of New Mexico is typical.159 Its statutes declare that a
"document of gift" may be a statement "imprinted on a motor vehicle
driver's license";160 that the OPO shall make "a reasonable search for a
document of gift"; 161 that on request of any interested person, "the person in
possession shall allow the interested person to examine or copy the docu-
ment of gift";162 and that any employee of the motor vehicle division who
acts in accordance with the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is not liable for
that act. 163
The conclusion that people can make is that either the New Mexico
OPO is not making a reasonable search (e.g., phoning the motor vehicle di-
vision and asking to be faxed a copy of the document of gift), or that the
motor vehicle department is an administrative system in which the need or
inclination to follow complex procedures impedes effective action by not
giving the New Mexico OPO access to donor information. Highway pa-
trolmen ordinarily can obtain the information on drivers' licenses. Surely,
if the police can communicate with the driver's license department, the
OPO and the driver's license department of New Mexico can find a way to
communicate information regarding donor designation. The New Mexico
legislature has specified that the OPO should have on-line computer access
to the driver's license department's donor lists and documents of gift. 64
What seems to be lacking is the desire to use the decedent's decision as the
basis for the OPO's decision.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2002).
160. Id. § 24-6A-l(B).
161. Id. § 24-6A-9.1(C).
162. Id. § 24-6A-7(B) (emphasis added).
163. Id. § 24-6A-I 1(C) (emphasis added).
164. Id. § 66-5-10(B) (1978).
The department shall mark the donor status on each person's driver's license record
and shall retain each application form or its image of a person who wishes to be a do-
nor. The department shall create and maintain a statewide donor registry and shall
provide on-line computer terminal access to the donor registry to organ procurement
agencies and procurement organizations, as defined in the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act. Authorized hospital or organ and tissue donor program personnel, immediately
prior to or after a donor's death, may request verification of the donor's status from the
department and may obtain a copy of the application from the department.
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I suspect the real, but unstated, reason for an OPO's refusal of a valid
organ donation if the next of kin does not "consent" is a human reflex to
give priority to the living person. 165 It is emotionally easier to say, "I am
sorry your husband died. Tell me what you want me to do?" It is more dif-
ficult to say, "Before you got here we checked with the driver's license bu-
reau; and we are doing what your husband wanted done." It is even more
difficult to say, "We waited three hours after your husband was declared
brain-dead, and you were not available so we had the coroner give consent
to remove his organs, which we have already done." It is possible that
medical personnel want to both increase their own emotional health by
avoiding confrontational conversations such as this and also decrease emo-
tional pain of the survivors. 166 Doing the legally and ethically right thing
may not always be the easiest emotional route, but that does not excuse
failure to do the right thing when a patient waiting for an organ will die
without it.
The transplant community's three excuses result in the decisions of the
two most important people in the organ gift process, the decedent donor and
the potential organ transplant recipient, being accorded little respect.167 In-
deed, seeking unnecessary consent for a decedent's decision treats the de-
cedent donor and the potential organ recipient poorly. There is a violation
of the statutory legal right, in states that have enacted either the 1968 or
1987 UAGA, of the decedent to make a gift, and there is an unnecessary
chance of death to a potential recipient. 68
V. THE COST TO SOCIETY OF AN OPO'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT
GIFTS
As of June 5, 2002, 52,772 patients were waiting on the kidney trans-
plant list in the United States; however, only 14,152 renal transplants were
performed in 2001.169 This shortfall has resulted in a terrible economic cost
165. See Jardine, supra note 42, at 1666 (stating that there is a sincere concern by the medi-
cal community for the well-being of a decedent's next of kin).
166. Laura R. Sophie, Intensive Care Nurses Perceptions of Cadaver Organ Procurement,
12 Heart & Lung 261, 264-65 (1983); cf., Thomas E. Starzl, Implied Consent for Cadaveric Or-
gan Donation, 251 JAMA 1592, 1592 (1984) (suggesting that the failure to retrieve organs repre-
sents the prejudices of physicians rather than those of the public); see also Jardine, supra note 42,
at 1666 (stating that the medical profession tries to give some form of solace to the next of kin by
asking for consent to procure organs).
167. See Jardine, supra note 42, at 1668.
168. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT (1987) § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993) (stating that an
anatomical gift that has not been effectively revoked by a donor does not require consent of any
person).
169. Federal OPTN data, available at http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/critdata_main.htm#
npwl (last visited July 12, 2002).
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to taxpayers and society.170  Each kidney transplant eliminates about
$40,000-the cost for keeping one person on dialysis for a year-in costs to
society per year.171 If this is multiplied by perhaps twenty years of life on
dialysis and the tens of thousands of persons on dialysis, it produces a stag-
gering number of possible taxpayer savings. A kidney from a decedent
could save society more than $500,000 over a twenty-year period.172 An
increase of one thousand kidney transplants could save society well over
$500,000,000 over a twenty-year period.
One estimate is that if all OPOs took all organs donated by decedents,
without asking for consent of next of kin, the number of organs recovered
would be more than doubled.173 What would two times as many transplants
do for society? The answer is impressive. We would have a smaller trans-
plant waiting list, Medicare would have a huge financial burden lifted from
it, and more people would be able to work fully and lead better lives.
VI. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN AN OPO'S REFUSAL
OF A DECEDENT'S GIFT
As stated, an OPO has a superior right to the body of a decedent donor
in all fifty states. 174 That is the undeniable basis for examination of the le-
gal position of the OPO vis-A-vis a surviving family member who does not
give consent to removal of organs. The OPO's rejection of a decedent's
valid donation of an organ, on the basis that an OPO has received no con-
sent from the next of kin, could result in the death of a person on the trans-
plant list.175 Would the OPO's rejection of valid gifts by decedents be
grounds for a suit against the OPO?
170. See A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR CLERGY, supra note 3, at I-1 (stating that taxpayers
could save millions of dollars by increasing the number of transplanted kidneys).
171. The payments by Medicare vary from state to state, but the average is about $2,000 a
month for dialysis maintenance alone. Maureen McKinley, Reimbursement for Treatment of End-
Stage Renal Disease, available at http://www.eparetn.com/healthcare/reimbursement.htm (last
visited June 13, 2002). Recent health insurance industry figures for the cost to an HMO for one
kidney dialysis patient is in the range of $60,000 to $90,000, which includes average problems
and needed medical care for a dialysis patient. Optimal Renal Care, Facts on the ERSD Popula-
tion and Medicare, available at http://www.optimalrenalcare.com (last visited June 13, 2002).
My use of $40,000 is intended to be conservative.
172. $40,000 per year times twenty years on dialysis that can be eliminated equals $800,000.
173. LATOUR, supra note 104, at 5.
174. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 8, 8A U.L.A. 55 (1993). I use the words "de-
cedent donor" in the legal sense of one who has made a donation before death. I am not using it in
the sense the medical community uses "donor" to mean "source of organs," who may or may not
have made what lawyers call a "donation."
175. Jardine, supra note 42, at 1667.
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Lawyers can identify several grounds for suit against an OPO that re-
jects a donation because of lack of consent of the next of kin.176 Likewise
there may be grounds for suit against family members who interfere with an
OPO's acceptance of anatomical gifts. 177 Indeed, Liability Issues Arising
Out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement Organizations' Rejection of
Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences178 is a handbook of
grounds for suit.179 It was published with "the hope ... that by empower-
ing would-be transplant patients with legal muscle, the organ donation
process will finally proceed as originally envisioned within the UAGA."S0
"A policy change [by OPOs would] be easily justified, as the medical pro-
fession [would] be doing only what it is legally bound to do."181
A. NEGLIGENCE
A jury could determine that an OPO owes a duty to perform its func-
tion for the benefit of potential organ recipients.182 A jury could also deter-
mine that rejection of a valid anatomical gift is negligence. 83 Furthermore,
an effectively prima facie standard of care may have already been set by the
UAGA's standard that donors' wishes are not to be vetoed by others. 8
4
Neither a judge nor a jury is likely to look kindly on an OPO that arbitrarily
vetoed deceased donors' valid gifts of organs at the cost of the death of pa-
tients waiting for organs.
OPOs cannot escape negligence liability because "everybody does
it."185 As Dean William Prosser has stated: "Even an entire industry ...
cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard... where common
knowledge and ordinary judgment will recognize unreasonable danger,
what everyone does may be found to be negligent."186 An individual pa-
tient on a transplant list might have a costly and difficult time finding the
evidence of an OPO rejecting a valid gift, but a class of persons waiting on
a transplant list would not likely find the task insurmountable. As the to-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 1990 WIs. L. REV. 1655 (1990).
179. Id. at 1667-94.
180. Id. at 1669.
181. Id. at 1693.
182. Id. at 1669.
183. Id.
184. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1993).
185. Jardine, supra note 42, at 1669 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS § 33 (5th ed. 1984)).
186. Id. at 1669 n.107. (quoting Dean Prosser from W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 33 (5th ed. 1984)).
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bacco, automobile, and insurance industries have discovered, a class of per-
sons can find counsel equipped to spend the necessary time and money.
B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
A transplant patient has an implied contract with the transplant center
and its OPO.187 The implied contract is that the transplant center and its
OPO will take any valid gift of an organ to be used in a transplant for an-
other (or at least to use the organ for someone else and thus move others up
the list for a future transplant).188 It could be considered tortious interfer-
ence by a family member when a contract is in existence, and the family
member's objection to a decedent's contract of gift results in failure to ren-
der the contracted service to the decedent.189 A court would likely find at-
tractive the following quotation from a tortious interference with contract
case, which held liable a third party that threatened a lawsuit, resulting in
failure of the physician to perform medical services expected by the pa-
tient. 190
When an ailing person selects a physician to treat him, he does so
with the full expectation that such physician will do his best to re-
store him to health, and the contract into which they enter is de-
serving of more attention from the law than a businessman's ex-
pectation of profit from a purely commercial transaction. 191
Courts are not likely to favor a family member interfering with both the
decedent's gift and also the implied contract between a transplant center or
OPO and a dying patient on the waiting list. 192 Why should anyone be fa-
vored who has deliberately frustrated the rational decision of a decedent and
thereby caused the death of someone on the waiting list?
C. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Contract theory also could be the basis for a suit against an offending
OPO.193 There is an implied term of the dying patient's listing himself with
a particular transplant institution for a transplant operation and paying for
services to become listed, that the institution and its OPO will accept a valid
187. Id. at 1687.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1688.
191. Id. (quoting Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 101 (N.D. Ohio
1965)).
192. See id. (discussing Hammonds, 237 F. Supp. at 101).
193. Id. at 1667 n.69.
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organ donation for use in transplantation.194 Would an OPO be breaching
implied contracts with transplant list patients by rejecting a valid anatomi-
cal gift and then seeking consent from next of kin? Certainly a jury could
so find.
D. VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. imposes liability on any person who, under
color of state law, deprives a citizen of any right secured by statute.195 Ac-
cording to the court in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center,196 a medical
organization is deemed operating "under color of state law when it is regu-
lated or funded by the government and enacts an internal regulation based
on what it (mistakenly or not) believes is a state law requirement and en-
forces it to deprive a person of a right." 197 A class may have a valid § 1983
claim against an OPO when (1) a class of transplant patients is deprived of
some transplants (2) due to an OPO's internal self imposed "consent"
regulation (3) which actually is not required by state law, (4) but is self-
enforced by the OPO as a purported requirement of state law.198 This sce-
nario fits into what the OPOs are doing when they make their decision to
accept a decedent's gift of an organ for transplantation dependent upon the
veto power of a next of kin.
Violation of civil rights can result in damages proportionate to the
damage inflicted. 199 The class's counsel would argue the question of the
monetary value of many lives. A class of persons could likely find counsel
equipped to spend the necessary time and money to find the necessary evi-
dence of the OPO's rejection of some organs that would have gone to some
members of the class. Indeed, the database of the Organ Procurement
Transplant Network (OPTN) operated by the federal government probably
is sufficient to find the specific recipient to whom a specific organ likely
would have gone, had it been accepted by the OPO.200
194. Id.
195. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
196. 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
197. Jardine, supra note 42, at 1667 n.69 (quoting Charleston Area Med. Cent., 529 F.2d at
644). Charleston Area Med. Center was not a transplant case, but did involve principles that
could apply to transplantation. The court hinted at the possibility of a class action suit. Id. (citing
Charleston Area Med. Cent., 529 F.2d at 645).
198. Charleston Area Med. Cent., 529 F.2d at 645.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
200. Organ Procurement Transplant Network (OPTN) available at http://www.optn.org (last
visited June 20, 2002).
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E. PROTECTION OF IMMUNITY STATUTES
What should be of paramount importance to the medical profession is
the effect that unnecessarily seeking consent could have on the immunity
status of an OPO.201 The important points are two and they are simple: (1)
If the OPO acts in accordance with the UAGA, then it has liability protec-
tion,202 and (2) if the OPO does not act in accordance with the UAGA
then it does not have liability protection. 203
An OPO's rejection of organs donated by a decedent on the basis that
there was no affirmative act of consent by next of kin conflicts with the
UAGA.204 A procedure that rejects a donor's gift and then sets out to get a
gift from the next of kin "cannot seriously be considered a [good faith act]
in accordance with the... UAGA."205
In Williams v. Hoffman,206 the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that
immunity under the 1968 UAGA does not protect the medical community
from suits by live transplant patients waiting on the list.207 An OPO should
take note of its potential liability to suit by the living patients on the waiting
list.
Jacobsen v. Marin General Hospital,208 should also be a wake-up call
to OPOs regarding legally unnecessary searches for consent from next of
kin.209 In Jacobsen, the California OPO requested a body from the coro-
ner.210 The OPO wisely did not search for next of kin, and simply accepted
the gift of the body from the coroner. 211 The deceased's parents sued, al-
leging that the Hospital and Network's "custodial relationship" with the
body of their son Martin gave rise to a duty owed to the Jacobsens to search
for Martin's next of kin and to protect their right to object to organ dona-
tion.212 The court dismissed the Jacobsens' three negligence claims.213 The
court said:
201. Jardine, supra note 42, at 1664.
202. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1987) § 11 (c), 8A U.L.A. 59-60 (1993).
203. Id.
204. Id. § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34.
205. Id. §§ 2(h), 1 (c), 8A U.L.A. 34, 59-60; Jardine, supra note 42, at 1664.
206. 223 N.W.2d 844 (Wis. 1974).
207. Williams, 223 N.W.2d at 846; see also Ravenis v. Detroit Gen. Hosp., 234 N.W.2d 411,
414 (Mich. 1975) (holding hospital liable for negligence to patients waiting for corneas); Jardine,
supra note 42, at 1664.
208. 192 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 1999).
209. Jacobsen, 192 F.3d at 884.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 886. Apparently, California has an OPO that does not seek consent from next of
kin if there is a valid gift. Under the UAGA, a coroner with possession of a body may make a
valid anatomical gift. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIF r ACT (1987) § 4(a), 8A U.L.A. 43 (1993).
212. Jacobsen, 192 F.3d at 885.
2002)
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Although the Jacobsens contend that the Hospital and Network
owed a duty to them arising from common law to search for Mar-
tin's next of kin, the Jacobsens cite to no authority for this propo-
sition, nor do we find such a duty existed. As stated previously, a
duty may exist under common law if the Hospital and Network af-
firmatively undertook to search for Martin's next of kin. Here,
however, the Jacobsens have not alleged facts to demonstrate that
the Hospital and Network affirmatively undertook to search for
Martin's next of kin. Nor do the facts alleged in the complaint
demonstrate a preexisting or special relationship between the Ja-
cobsens and the Hospital and Network giving rise to such a duty.
Finally, the public policy rationale articulated in the Gift Act
would not warrant imposing a duty to search for Martin's next of
kin on the Hospital and Network.214
The legal lesson from Jacobsen is that OPOs should not search unnecessar-
ily for next of kin.2 15
VII. THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN AN OPO'S REFUSAL
OF DECEDENT'S GIFT
Ethical analysis is also a necessary component of the decision process
by OPOs in deciding whether to accept an organ donation.2 16 The ethical
principles chosen may change the ethical decision. Ethical analysis may
proceed satisfactorily only if the particular ethical principles to be applied
are announced and accepted. 217
The three principles most directly applicable to organ and tissue trans-
plantation are utility, justice, and autonomy. 218 In selecting these principles
I agree with the position paper of the United Network for Organ Sharing's
subcommittee on ethical distribution, which said:
The ideal allocation [of organs for transplantation] would be one
that simultaneously maximized the aggregate amount of (medical)
good, distributed the good equitably, respected the autonomous
decisions of individuals, and was in accord with any other ethical
principles that might come into play.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 886 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 844.
216. Wendler & Dickert, supra note 14, at 329-33.
217. United Network for Organ Sharing, 1991 Ethics Committee, Principles of Organ and
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[A] consensus has been reached for purposes of public policy rela-
tive to organ and tissue allocation: utility (taken as medical util-
ity .... ) and justice (or fairness in distribution) should be given
equal status.
A third basic principle plays a controversial and sometimes am-
biguous role in deciding what is a morally appropriate allocation.
In a free society, the autonomy of individuals is given great im-
portance.
219
The Patient Affairs Committee of the United Network for Organ Shar-
ing 220 came to the conclusion that only the principles of utility and justice
should be used in the analysis of what is a fair system of allocation. 22 1 But,
it appears to me that the concept of autonomy of the individual is so in-
grained in our culture that it must be included in an ethical analysis regard-
ing organ donation.
Other authors, in analyzing problems similar to the one discussed here,
have used the three principles of utility, justice, and autonomy. For exam-
ple, Ethical Analysis of Organ Recovery Denials by Medical Examiners,
Coroner, and Justices of the Peace,222 used an ethical framework of non-
maleficence, beneficence, justice, and autonomy derived from Beauchamp
and Childress.223 I would argue that in the transplantation setting, the
analysis choosing nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, and autonomy is
actually the same as using utility, justice, and autonomy as I do here.
A. UTILITY
Utility refers to the principle that the greatest good should be done for
the greatest number of persons. 224 It originated in the thoughts of Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill as a method for determining social policy.225
219. Id. at 2229.
220. PATIENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN DISTRIBUTION,
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, A POSITION PAPER 2 (1991).
221. Id.
222. Shafer, et al, supra note 13.
223. Id. at 233, 235.
224. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 125 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell 1948)
(1789).
225. See id.; see also JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 189-212 (Me-
ridian Publishing, 1961).
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Utility is a theory of consequences. 226 Utility is mathematics of pluses for
good and minuses for bad.227 I agree that ethicists such as Beuchamp and
Childress, certainly two of the most influential proponents of principlism,
would prefer that the two principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence
should be separately distinguished and used in the ethical analysis. 228
However, utility in the context of organ transplantation is a category that,
for all practical purposes, fully includes nonmaleficence (do no harm) and
beneficence (actively help others). 229 Further, utility already is a familiar
concept to transplantation professionals. 230
Organ transplantation is a public enterprise undertaken to benefit the
public. 23 1 Indeed, the Task Force on Organ Transplantation took it as as-
sumed that organs are "a national resource to be used for the public
good." 232 Therefore, utility is an appropriate norm to apply in an ethical
analysis of actions by OPOs.
In measuring OPOs' transplantation policies by the yardstick of ethical
utility, I would apply two limitations. First, in applying the concept of util-
ity to a public policy in the United States, the social status or social useful-
ness of individuals who are donating organs or receiving organ transplants
should not be considered.233 Second, in applying the concept of utility to an
ethical problem in transplantation, the benefits and harms considered should
be limited to medical expenses and medical health.2 34
Utility seems easily satisfied by maximizing the number of organs
available for transplant because the most people would benefit.235 Taking
the decedent's donation even if next of kin object is more likely to increase
the supply of organs. The public good is increased by the increase in the
number of years of quality life available to the population. 236 In addition to
years of quality life, consider cost. It costs less to have a healthy person
than to maintain a sick person for years. Organ transplants result in a net
decrease in society's total medical costs. 237 Kidney transplants versus di-
226. TOM L. BEAUSCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 47
(Oxford Univ. Press, 4th ed. 1994).
227. Id.
228. Shafer, et al., supra note 13, at 235-37.
229. UNOS, supra note 217, at 2227.
230. Id. at 2228.
231. Id. at 2227.
232. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES & RECOMMENDATIONS xxi (1986).
233. UNOS, supra note 217, at 2228.
234. Id.
235. See supra text accompanying note 224.
236. UNOS, supra note 217, at 2227.
237. See, e.g., A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR CLERGY, supra note 3, at I- 1.
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alysis is the prime example of what more transplants can do for total medi-
cal costs to society. 238
B. JUSTICE
The National Organ Transplant Act is the origin of the organization of
OPOs.239 The Act mandated justice and equity in the organ procurement
system.240 Therefore, not only for those of us who believe in justice as a
criterion, but also for transplant system professionals, justice is an appropri-
ate criterion to apply in an ethical analysis of OPO actions. 241
Justice is the proper relationship between persons in encounter, and for
this there must be adequacy and there must be equality.242 For some per-
sons, justice is found in a divine or natural order.243 For others justice is re-
defined as fairness.244 Fairness in turn is defined as "right dealing between
persons who are... competing with one another." 245
United States society demands that utility and justice be considered
jointly. In a democratic society, compromises between utility and justice
are necessary in order to avoid the tyranny of the majority.246 Unlike util-
ity, justice is not concerned exclusively with achieving the maximum good
for the greatest number of people, but is concerned with security in society,
conformity to rule, and distributive fairness according to performance, need,
and choice.247 In my view, most persons would agree that justice in an or-
gan recovery and distribution system should assure a distribution of ade-
quacy and equality.
The OPO in providing justice should thus always accept a donation of a
transplantable organ to assure adequacy for those on the list. Justice would
also assure equality of supply for those on the transplant list at various
times, in diverse parts of the country. Therefore, all OPOs should use a uni-
238. Supra Part V.
239. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 372(a), 98 Stat. 2344 (1984).
240. Id. § 101(b)(3)(E), 98 Stat. 2340.
241. See id.
242. HONORE, supra note 21, at 194-95.
243. See JOHN COGLEY ET AL., NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY, 11-28 (World Pub-
lishing Co., 1962).
244. E.g., John Rawls, Justice and Fairness, 54 J. Phil. 653, 657 (1957).
245. Id.
246. HONORE, supra note 21, at 237-38; ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL
ETHICS 302 (Basic Books 1981). I would agree with Veatch that in the simpler cases "[t]he duty
of justice is a higher lexical priority than the duty to produce good." VEATCH, supra at 302. In
the analysis here, there is no substantial difference between justice and utility in the actions they
would direct for the OPO in regard to accepting an organ gift. Thus no need exists in this analysis
to make a lexical priority.
247. VEATCH, supra note 246, at 197.
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form policy of maximum acceptance of organ gifts, not a policy of organ
gift acceptance dependent upon consent by next of kin.
Justice is a relationship of beings in encounter.248 It presupposes that
beings will be able to encounter. 249 It thus affirms that people have a right
to participate in the events that effect their lives and desires. 250 A transplant
patient waiting on a list has no way to participate directly in the acceptance
or rejection by an OPO of an organ gift. Justice thus requires that OPOs
consider, and to that extent represent, the transplant patients in deciding
whether to accept valid organ gifts. Representing the interests of transplant
patients would be done by accepting the gift of a decedent donor. Repre-
senting the interests of transplant patients would not be done by rejecting an
organ gift from a decedent or by the taking the chance that next of kin will
donate the organ from the same source.
There is something to Lon Fuller's view that the legal order has an im-
plicit or internal morality. 251 In a democracy, laws are enacted on society's
ideas based on an implicit internal morality.252 To phrase it differently: our
laws on organ transplantation are based on the majority's idea of distribu-
tive justice.253 The UAGA has as its internal morality the goal of increasing
organ transplantation. 254 This goal is not a goal constructed in an ivory
tower of academia, but is one actually set forth by a public morality in ac-
tion. An OPO violates society's expression of how justice should be im-
plemented in distribution of scarce goods when it violates the UAGA
statutory scheme.
C. AUTONOMY
Autonomy, in the context of organ transplantation, refers to the princi-
ple of respecting the self-determination of autonomous individuals. 255
Gauthier's description of autonomy is appropriate in the transplant set-
ting. 256 She stated:
We recognize that as a free and rational being, [a person] has the
capacity to choose his or her own goals and projects on the basis
248. See Rawls supra note 244, at 657.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 645 (1958).
252. COGLEY ET AL., supra note 243, at 59-62.
253. Shafer et al., supra note 13, at 242.
254. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 20-22 (1993).
255. UNOS, supra note 217, at 2229.
256. Candace C. Gauthier, Philosophical Foundations of Respect for Autonomy, 3 KENNEDY
INST. OF ETHICS J. 21, 24 (1993).
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of moral principles known by reason and, thus, to act on a personal
conception of what is right. Only when we respect and do not in-
terfere with others' goals, projects, and actions, chosen by their
own conception of what is right, are we respecting their autonomy
as rational agents. 257
All modern philosophers since Kant have had to come to some terms
with the notion of individual human freedom.258 The United States' culture,
its religions, and its professional standards highly prize autonomy. 259 It is
so ingrained that autonomy must be addressed in any ethical analysis of ac-
tions in the United States.260 As David Thomasma correctly suggests: the
principle of autonomy, which means so much to North Americans, may not
be a universal norm appropriate to all countries.2 6 1 But, in a free society we
tend to think that a practice is right if it respects the choices one makes to
live one's life.262
Autonomy in the context of accepting or rejecting an organ gift by a
deceased donor would mandate accepting the donor's gift unless a compet-
ing equal or greater autonomy exists.263 A next of kin's demand that an
OPO reject an organ gift is an attempt to block the autonomous choice of
the decedent. 264 The decision of the next of kin to block the donation is not
ethically sufficient to overcome that of the deceased donor regarding his
own body.265 In most medical situations, the medical community should
feel comfortable giving priority to the preference of a decedent who made a
rational decision and subsequently lost decision-making capacity over the
preference of a family member to violate the decedent's decision. 266 OPOs
should feel ethically comfortable when they give priority to the decedent
donor's decision. If a deceased person has donated his organs, and an OPO
does not honor the directive, respect for autonomy is shattered.
257. Id.
258. VEATCH, supra note 246, at 193.
259. Id. at 194.
260. Shafer et al., supra note 13, at 239.
261. David C. Thomasma, Bioethics and International Human Rights, 25 J. OF LAW, MED.
& ETHICS 295, 298 (1997).
262. Gauthier, supra note 256, at 24.
263. Shafer, et al., supra note 13, at 239.
264. Gauthier, supra note 256, at 22.
265. Shafer et al., supra note 13, at 238-39.
266. See BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 189-
190, 344 (Williams & Wilkins 1995) (stating that retrieving organs from decedents who have
signed donor cards "is reasonable and consistent with other policies").
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VIII. CONCLUSION
If a decedent has made a valid anatomical gift, an OPO has the su-
preme right to take the organs.267 There is no legal reason to seek consent
of the decedent's next of kin.268 Further, an OPO that requests consent of
next of kin when there is a known donation by the decedent runs some risk
of liability and may lose the protection of immunity statutes. 269
There is a moral imperative to accept the valid organ gift by a dece-
dent. An OPO should take a decedent donor's organ gift even if the next of
kin objects. An OPO that seeks the consent of next of kin, when there is a
known donation by the decedent, violates the ethical principles of justice,
utility, and autonomy. 270
267. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIF ACT (1987) § 8(a), 8A U.L.A. 55-56 (1993).
268. See supra Part 11.
269. See supra Part VI.
270. See supra Part VII.
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